The evolution of cooperative, pro-social behavior under circumstances in which individual interests are at odds with common interests—circumstances characterized as social dilemmas—remains a largely unsolved, multidisciplinary puzzle. Approaches to these types of problems have, for the most part, been applications of evolutionary game theory. While the study of networks, complex systems, and nonlinear dynamics has pervaded most scientific disciplines, the application of related tools to the study of social dilemmas represents a very new, but extremely promising means of shedding light on the quandary of cooperation. In this work, we situate agents engaging in social dilemma games on complex social networks, allowing us to more fully investigate the impact of average degree and degree variance, or heterogeneity of degree, on the evolution of pro-social behavior. Our results suggest that increasing homogeneity of degree produces network effects that make the emergence of pro-social behaviors more likely thereby increasing overall social welfare. As such, homogeneity of degree is properly thought of as a collective good.